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CHAPTER ONE: A WAR OF PREEMPTION 
The world changed after 9/11.  American foreign policy was forced to take a more 
aggressive stance against potential threats throughout the world.  By implementing the 
Bush doctrine, President George W. Bush sought to reform American foreign policy by 
waging a preventive war against terrorism and the countries that harbored terrorists.  
After 9/11 the primary target of the United States was Afghanistan where the Taliban 
ruled and those responsible for the terrorist attacks were located.  By waging war in 
Afghanistan the Bush administration launched a full assault against terrorism in order to 
ensure the safety of the United States.  Besides Afghanistan, Iraq was another country 
high on the administration’s priority list due to possible ties to terrorism as well as the 
potential threat of weapons of mass destruction.   
 The Bush administration identified Iraq as one of the biggest threats to the United 
States because of the previous history between the two countries.  The dictatorship of 
Saddam Hussein represented a major threat to the United States due to its potential for 
WMD along with Saddam Hussein’s prior use of chemical weapons.  The WMD being 
addressed consist of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.  While all three are their 
own separate entity, they can all be considered as WMD.  Aside from its potential 
capability of WMD, Iraq also held a strategic position in the Middle East economically 
and militarily.  From a diplomatic standpoint, there were many reasons why the Bush 
administration chose to invade Iraq in March 2003, however none was so great as the 
possibility of Saddam Hussein wielding the power of nuclear weapons. 
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  In a post-9/11 era, the Bush administration knew that it could not take any risks 
nor rule out any possibilities.  However, the Bush administration could not launch an 
invasion of Iraq based on pure speculation.  For this reason extensive research was 
carried out to determine the extent of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program.  In 
order to conduct an invasion of Iraq and overthrow its government, the Bush 
administration needed solid evidence to support its claims.  The intelligence gathered by 
the Intelligence Community leading up to the March 2003 invasion proved to be the 
deciding factor in whether or not the United States invaded Iraq.  Based on the research 
gathered, the Bush administration concluded that it should launch an invasion of Iraq as a 
means of preventive war.  The Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
by saying that there was strong intelligence pointing to the existence of WMD stockpiles.  
Furthermore, the biggest motivation for the invasion was rooted in the possibility that 
Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons.  If Saddam Hussein did not already 
possess nuclear weapons, there was a strong possibility that he would in the coming 
years.  This is significant in relation to the Bush administration’s motives because after 
the invasion of Iraq no WMD were actually found, spurring the notion that the main 
reason for invasion was nonexistent.  This led many people to believe that there was a 
failure of intelligence going into the war and that possibly the Bush administration had 
ulterior motives for waging war in Iraq.  However, the fact that no WMD were found 
after the U.S. invasion does not mean that they never existed.  There is the possibility that 
any evidence or material relating to WMD in Iraq was either destroyed or it still has not 
been found.  Saddam Hussein’s refusal to cooperate with weapons inspections and United 
Nations Security Resolutions over the years left many officials skeptical about whether or 
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not he had something to hide from the rest of the world.  Either Saddam Hussein did have 
WMD that he needed to keep hidden, or he wanted people to believe that he had WMD 
for the security of Iraq against other nations.  Many people thought that Saddam Hussein 
did have chemical and biological weapons and he was in the process of developing a 
nuclear weapons program.  Nevertheless, the intelligence played an integral part in the 
decision for the United States to invade Iraq and therefore the accuracy of the intelligence 
leading up to the war was the deciding factor in whether or not the Bush administration 
would make a well-informed decision. 
Regarding the intelligence going into the war in Iraq, several possibilities exist.  
One possibility is that the intelligence was accurate and the Bush administration 
interpreted it properly.  This possibility implies that the Intelligence Community and the 
Bush administration acted appropriately in carrying out their duty.  The second 
possibility is that the intelligence was gathered properly and it was unbiased; however, 
the Bush administration interpreted it in a manner that would support its motive to go to 
war.  The final possibility is that the Intelligence Community did not properly gather 
intelligence because it received pressure from the Bush administration to attain a certain 
result.  If this assumption were true, both the Intelligence Community and the Bush 
administration would be at fault because the intelligence was gathered in a manner that 
would produce a certain result and also the Bush administration influenced the 
intelligence without any regard for the actual truth but instead for the sake of creating a 
cause for war.  The problem one must confront is determining which one of these 
possibilities is most likely the truth.  If the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq 
because there was solid intelligence that supported the existence of WMD in Iraq, then 
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the United States’ reason of protecting itself from WMD in the hands of a dictator would 
have been justified.  Many believe that for the sake of national security, the possibility of 
an attack was reason alone to take action.  However, if the Bush administration 
influenced the gathering of intelligence in order to produce a biased result that supported 
the existence of WMD, then the war in Iraq would have been conducted under false 
pretenses and the motivation for war, which was given to the American people, and the 
rest of the world would not have been legitimate.   
The Iraq War was conducted as a means of prevention.  President Bush, in his war 
ultimatum on March 18, 2003 stated “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, 
one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their 
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our 
country, or any other.”1  One belief is that it was unfinished business from the previous 
Gulf War and the Bush administration felt that it was in the best interest of the United 
States to remove Saddam Hussein from power.  Following 9/11 the Bush administration 
took the offensive in waging a war on terrorism and Iraq was included in this offensive.  
However the primary reason for war that was presented to the American people was the 
belief that Saddam Hussein had WMD stockpiles.   The question that must be asked is 
whether or not the Bush administration had the right to tell the public that the reason for 
waging war was the existence of WMD in Iraq.  To answer this question one must 
explore the content of the intelligence as well as how it was used to fully understand the 
magnitude of the situation.   
                                                        
1
  John Ehrenberg and eds. The Iraq Papers, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 
110-113. 
 5 
When examining the intelligence that was gathered going into the Iraq War, one 
must consider every possibility when forming an opinion.  Due to the fact that the war in 
Iraq has only recently ended and that the United States still maintains a presence in the 
country, it has not been long enough to know all of the facts.  When gathering 
intelligence regarding WMD one cannot expect to have all of the information readily 
accessible.  This is especially true in the case of Iraq where a dictator like Saddam 
Hussein refused to cooperate with weapons resolutions for years.  However, we must 
hope that based on the intelligence that we do have, officials are confident in the 
decisions they make.  In the case of Iraq, we must hope that officials in the Bush 
administration considered all of the intelligence and weighed all of the options 
dispassionately before arriving at the decision to go to war.  If this is not the case and 
instead there was a failure of intelligence or the Bush administration used the intelligence 
in a way that would support its motives, then allegations of WMD in Iraq were fabricated 
to gain the support of the American people.  On the other hand, in a post-9/11 era, the 
Bush administration might have felt that it could not take any chances and even the 
smallest inkling of a nuclear threat deserved the administration’s undivided attention 
along with preventive military action.  After taking this into consideration, one can 
determine whether or not the potential existence of WMD in Iraq was a legitimate reason 
to go to war.  
Critics of President Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq make the following 
argument.  While the war in Iraq may have been a preemptive war in the best interest of 
the national security of the United States, the reasons for war were exaggerated due to an 
intelligence failure and the misrepresentation of intelligence by the Bush administration.  
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The Bush administration did not want to risk the threat of Saddam Hussein’s growing 
WMD program and therefore it took preemptive action by launching an invasion of Iraq 
and removing Saddam Hussein from power.  While this action may have been perceived 
to be in the best interest of national security, it was carried out under the notion that Iraq 
had ties to terrorism as well as WMD.  The problem lies in the fact that the Bush 
administration did not have sufficient evidence to make these claims to the public as 
justification for going to war.  While the existence of WMD was the primary issue in 
regards to Iraq, the Intelligence Community did not provide conclusive evidence to 
support this claim.  Furthermore, the Bush administration failed in the sense that it 
presented the intelligence to the public in a way that would support its motives.  
Following the Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein repeatedly ignored UN Security 
Council Resolutions 687 and 1441 as well as mandated UN weapons inspections intended 
to ensure that Saddam Hussein was not reconstituting his weapons programs.  Due to the 
fact that Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the rest of the world and he had 
already used chemical weapons in the past, the Bush administration was left to believe 
that he had something to hide and that he posed an imminent threat to the United States 
as well as the rest of the world.  The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 can be attributed to 
the Bush Doctrine and the plan to take preemptive action against any nation that harbors 
terrorism or poses a serious threat to the United States.  However the 2003 invasion 
cannot be attributed to solid evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD.  While some 
intelligence does exist that Saddam Hussein did have the potential for WMD and he did 
have possible ties to terrorists, this intelligence was not formidable enough for it to be 
presented to the American people as a justification for war. 
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  The president’s defenders respond that the situation can be viewed from another 
perspective.  Due to Saddam Hussein’s constant refusal to comply with weapons 
resolutions or weapons inspections, many were left to believe that he had something to 
hide.  Instead of risking the possibility that Saddam Hussein did have weapons stockpiles 
and not taking action, the Bush administration decided that for the sake of national 
security it had to remove the dictator from power because of even the smallest possibility 
that WMD were present in Iraq.  There was some knowledge of chemical and biological 
weapons programs in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and he had already used chemical 
weapons in the past.  While the intelligence may have been weak regarding the presence 
of WMD stockpiles in Iraq, the Bush administration felt that it was better to be safe than 
sorry.  In many ways the Bush administration misled the public by saying it had strong 
evidence of the existence of WMD; however, it was doing so for the greater good of 
national security because it did not want to risk another tragedy.  Furthermore, even 
though we never located any kind of nuclear weapons program or WMD, the possibility 
still remains that they did exist or there was some level of development however they 
were either destroyed before we could get to them or they were transported out of the 
country or they are still hidden.  There are many reasons why the Bush administration 
wanted to go to war in Iraq.  However the existence of WMD was the one reason that 
would win the approval of the American people along with the rest of the world and 
make the war appear justified.  For the sake of foreign policy and national security, 
regime change in Iraq was in the best interest of the United States.    
To understand the course of events leading up to the 2003 war in Iraq as well as 
how the intelligence was gathered to arrive at the decision one must look at how officials 
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use intelligence as a means of conducting foreign policy, at the intelligence that supports 
the Bush administration’s decision to go to war based on the existence of WMD, and at 
evidence of misinterpretation and failed intelligence which was used to support 
allegations of WMD and give cause for war.  These three things provide the necessary 
information for one to decide whether or not the potential existence of WMD was a 
legitimate reason for the Bush administration to give to the American people as a reason 
for war.   
I will begin with an overview of the president’s role in conducting foreign policy.  
This will provide information on National Intelligence Estimates, which are given high 
consideration when making decisions, and how presidents can take certain actions to 
politicize intelligence.  From there I will look at the actual intelligence that supported the 
existence of WMD as well as the Bush administration’s case for why WMD were present 
in Iraq.  This can be found in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations in February 2003, 
President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati in October 2002.  After examining intelligence that 
supported the Bush administration’s claims, I will then identify areas in which there was 
a failure of intelligence.  Here I will draw on several sources including the Senate Select 
Committees June 2003 report, The Iraq Survey Group Final Report, the personal account 
of George Tenet, and the personal account of Ambassador Joseph Wilson.   
Prior to the war the Bush administration made the situation appear as if WMD 
were in Iraq and the United States needed to confront the threat they posed to national 
security.  The Bush administration based this on intelligence that they claimed was 
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conclusive.  The fact of the matter is that the intelligence was not conclusive and there is 
a great deal of evidence and personal accounts from top officials that prove this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT AND INTELLIGENCE IN 
CONDUCTING FOREIGN POLICY 
In order to understand how the intelligence was gathered and how it was used by 
the Bush administration in the context of the Iraq War of 2003, one must first understand 
the general process of how intelligence should be used by the President and his officials 
when conducting foreign policy.  There are many ways to interpret intelligence and this 
can have a serious effect on the manner in which foreign policy is carried out.  When it 
comes to foreign policy, the President has the final say in what action the United States is 
going to take.  However this does not mean that the President makes his decisions alone.  
In almost every decision, the President consults with his closest advisors, known as 
“senior” and “junior” participants.2  He does this so he can make the most informed 
decision possible in the best interest of the United States.  In the case of intelligence, the 
President relies on the Director of Intelligence along with people from the State 
Department and Defense Department to produce national intelligence estimates.3  
Presidents rely on National Intelligence Estimates to make important decisions.  In fact, 
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was the primary piece of evidence for 
the President’s conclusion that there were WMD in Iraq.  This brings up the subject of 
how the President and his participants should use intelligence.  Intelligence can be very 
useful to a President in providing him with valuable information about a current 
international situation.  However, intelligence in many regards is just information and it 
should not be misconstrued as facts.  The President and his participants are supposed to 
                                                        
2
  Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 16 
3
  Ibid, 17 
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use intelligence as an aid to help them make foreign policy decisions.  However, the 
President should never use intelligence to his advantage by interpreting it in a way that 
might supplement his own administration’s personal agenda.  When conducting foreign 
policy it is imperative that the President and his participants treat intelligence as raw, 
unbiased information that may not be completely factual. 
When conducting foreign policy, the President and the rest of his participants 
form foreign policy objectives that they feel are in the best interest of the United States.  
However in order to decide whether these objectives are feasible or even valid, extensive 
analysis is carried out.  Through analysis the President and his participants can rule out 
any possible flaws to their objectives.  “When an analysis or a set of arguments 
substantially reduces the range of uncertainty and unambiguously points to the 
desirability of a particular stand, that position is likely to be adopted by most, if not all, 
participants.”4  Based on this reasoning, effective analysis provides decision makers with 
valuable information, which they can use to make sound judgment and rule out any 
unlikely alternatives.  In the case of the war in Iraq, the Bush administration believed that 
Saddam Hussein had WMD.  However, it was only after the Intelligence Community 
performed in-depth analysis on the matter that the Bush administration decided it was 
likely.  More importantly, the Bush administration labeled Iraq as a potential nuclear 
threat within the next decade and the Intelligence Community confirmed this notion.  
However, the manner in which the Intelligence Community conducted its analysis and 
the way the Bush administration interpreted it remains a problem. 
                                                        
4
  Ibid, 20 
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  Many times, and especially in the case of Iraq, actions of foreign policy may 
receive strict scrutiny from the public.  As a way to persuade the public and gain its 
favor, a President might present his decision from a slightly different angle even though it 
might not be the exact reasoning behind the decision.5  Regarding the war in Iraq, one 
argument is that President Bush told the public that there was strong evidence for WMD 
in Iraq because he knew that this would gain the public’s approval for going to war.  If 
this happens to be the case, and President Bush oversold the data, there is an ethical 
dilemma in which President Bush misled the public, regardless of the fact that the 
invasion of Iraq might have been in the best interest of the United States.  When 
gathering intelligence, the job of the analyst is to gather as much information on the 
subject as possible without attempting to slant the information in any way.  From there it 
is up to the policymakers to interpret the intelligence so they can make informed 
decisions.  In no way should an analyst attempt to draw conclusions from the intelligence 
because doing so would create a biased analysis.  It is also the responsibility of the 
policymakers such as the President to respect all of the intelligence for what it’s worth 
without using it for the sole purpose of perpetuating an agenda.  The intelligence should 
not be misinterpreted to support foreign policy decisions but rather foreign policy 
decisions should be made based on solid intelligence.  In the Iraq War one intelligence 
officer believed that the Bush administration “politicized” the intelligence in order for it 
to fit the administration’s intentions of removing Saddam Hussein.6  Unfortunately 
politicization of intelligence happens a great deal and it is only one of the ways in which 
an administration can take advantage of intelligence.   
                                                        
5
  Ibid, 78 
6
  Ibid, 147 
 13
The Intelligence Community as well as the President can make many maneuvers 
to try to affect the intelligence in a way that will depict a particular situation in a certain 
way.  One maneuver a policymaker might employ is to report information that only 
supports his or her stand.7  By ignoring particular facts about a situation a policymaker 
can make his or her particular stance appear to be much stronger than it actually is.8  In 
particular, the intelligence community in Iraq continued to concentrate its analysis on 
certain areas and as a result the same analysis continued to be reported.9  Another 
maneuver is to arrange information in a way that will keep people from seeing certain 
information.10  By hiding specific information one can easily influence the perspective 
one might take on any particular subject.  Furthermore, one can utilize people who he or 
she knows will provide a particular result.11  In this way a policymaker can be sure that 
the analysis will convey the information exactly how he or she wishes.  It is obvious that 
there are numerous methods to try to skew intelligence in a way that will support one’s 
position.  However, the fact of the matter is that all of these strategies are wrong and in 
many ways unethical.  The gathering of intelligence should always be carried out in an 
unbiased fashion in which all of the facts are presented equally.  From there the President 
and his administration should use the intelligence to make a logical decision.  Because it 
is so easy to interpret intelligence in a way that might support one’s position, the misuse 
of intelligence goes on all the time.  However in the context of the invasion of a nation 
and a full-scale war in which the trust of the public and hundreds of thousands of lives 
                                                        
7
  Ibid, 164 
8
  Ibid, 164 
9
  Ibid, 165 
10
  Ibid, 166 
11
 Ibid, 168 
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are at stake, it is imperative that the intelligence process is carried out correctly from the 
point of view of both the President as well as the entire Intelligence Community.  
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CHAPTER THREE: INTELLIGENCE OF WMD AND THE CASE FOR WAR 
While the Bush administration has received a great deal of scrutiny for allegedly 
conducting the Iraq war under false pretenses, there is evidence that supports the 
administration’s decision to invade Iraq.  From the outset, the reasoning behind possible 
military action in Iraq was preemption.  Based on the reformed National Security 
Strategy of the United States in September, 2002, also known as the Bush Doctrine, the 
United States was going to take a preemptive strategy against terrorism as well as any 
nation that harbors terrorists or any nation that might provide terrorists with WMD.  This 
new national security strategy adopted by the Bush administration was revolutionary in 
the sense that it abandoned any previous strategy of containment or defense and justified 
an offensive against enemies of the United States.  This new strategy came about largely 
after the tragedies of 9/11 when the Bush administration realized that it needed to take a 
tougher stance against any nation or group that posed a threat to the United States.  The 
Bush administration’s argument was that if it hesitated to take action against any threats 
the consequence might be the destruction of an entire American city.12  This created a 
sense of urgency within the administration.  When addressing WMD, the Bush Doctrine 
states “The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD 
compels us to action…The United States has long maintained the options of preemptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security…the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.”13  Based on this newly adopted security strategy, the Bush 
administration identified Iraq as a threat to the United States and a possible target of 
                                                        
12
 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade 
Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 132. 
13
   U.S. President Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America September 2002.” Code of Federal Regulations, title3, pp.1-31 (2002). 
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preemptive action due to the possibility that it might use WMD or provide them to 
terrorists.  Whether or not Iraq possessed WMD at the time was not as important as the 
potential threat that Iraq posed to U.S. national security.  
The argument can be made that based on its new strategy the Bush administration 
could have targeted other nations with weapons of mass destruction such as North Korea 
or Iran.  However the focus was on Iraq due to the fact that the United States had trouble 
dealing with Saddam Hussein ever since the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein repeatedly 
refused to comply with UN regulations, and Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons 
in the past.  The thought of nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein was 
terrifying to the Bush administration and it wanted to avoid this at all costs.  There were 
several claims regarding Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capacity leading up to the war and 
whether or not he actually had nuclear weapons, however, the thought that he could 
possibly be developing nuclear weapons was reason enough for the Bush administration 
to get rid of him for the sake of national security.14  Even though Iraq posed a threat to 
the United States and its allies, the Bush administration could not conduct war on a whim 
and it could not justify war without any intelligence to support it.  Ideally, the situation in 
Iraq would be handled diplomatically and military intervention would be used as a last  
resort.  While regime change in Iraq may have been in the best interest of U.S. national 
security at the time, the Bush administration had to investigate all the possible scenarios 
and gather as much intelligence as possible before making any snap judgments. 
                                                        
14
  James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, Intelligence and National Security 
Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives (Texas A&M University: 
Manchester University Press, 2008) 62. 
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The Intelligence Community conducted a huge process of intelligence gathering 
on Iraq in order to find as much as possible about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs 
and the extent to which they posed a serious threat to U.S. national security.  One of the 
main pieces of intelligence that supported Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD was 
the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 2002.  To gain further understanding 
of the extent of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capabilities, the Bush administration instructed 
the Intelligence Community to come up with an NIE on the subject.  The October 2002 
NIE was largely conclusive in the existence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq 
as well as the continuing development of WMD.15 The NIE also concluded that the 
completion of Iraq’s first nuclear weapon was contingent upon how quickly it acquired 
weapons-grade fissile material.16  The NIE reported that once Iraq had weapons-grade 
fissile material, it “could make a nuclear weapon within a year.”17  From the very 
beginning of the NIE it is evident that based on whatever intelligence it had, the 
Intelligence Community had reason to believe that Iraq’s potential for nuclear weapons 
was strong and if they did not have nuclear weapons already, it would have them in the 
near future.  The October 2002 NIE goes on to elaborate on Iraq’s weapons programs and 
the threat they posed.  The NIE addresses the fact that Iraq has failed to comply with UN 
Resolution 687 which was enacted in April 1991, and ordered Iraq to declare or destroy 
any WMD as well as cease any further development of WMD in the future.18  The NIE 
reports: “Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its 
                                                        
15
  Central Intelligence Agency. “National Intelligence Estimate October, 2002: 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass destruction Programs.” (accessed October 19, 2010) 1. 
16
  Ibid, 1. 
17
  Ibid, 1. 
18
  Ibid, 3. 
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declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its 
weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.”19  Furthermore, the NIE reports that 
Iraqi security personnel took serious action to try to hide material relating to Iraq’s 
weapons program in an attempt to thwart inspections.20  Based on the information 
provided by the NIE, one can see that Iraq continually defied the UN Security Council as 
well as misled the world in regards to its weapons programs and its nuclear weapons 
capabilities ever since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.   From the perspective of the 
Bush administration, it is obvious that the United States needed to take some form of 
action, whether diplomatic or military, as a means of eliminating Iraq’s potential threat to 
U.S. national security.   
Iraq’s weapons programs were of great concern to the United States and the rest 
of the world ever since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.  Saddam Hussein’s previous 
use of chemical weapons made it clear to the United States that he still possessed those 
capabilities in 2002.  However, the most important aspect that the Bush administration 
needed to know about was Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability.  This information was 
crucial in the sense that it posed the biggest threat to national security.  The intelligence 
on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was essential in determining whether or not the 
United States should take military action.  The NIE is very clear in pointing out that 
continued oversight over the years from the UN and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has not reduced Saddam Hussein’s desire to possess nuclear weapons.21  
According to the NIE “Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear 
                                                        
19
  Ibid, 3. 
20
  Ibid, 3. 
21
  Ibid, 5. 
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program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, 
accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.”22  Furthermore, many intelligence 
experts suspected that Iraq was attempting to acquire tens of thousands of high-strength 
aluminum tubes.23  This was of major concern to the Bush administration.  Although the 
aluminum tubes could also be used for conventional weapons, there was the possibility 
that they could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program in the development of nuclear 
weapons.24  The NIE points out numerous times that the one major thing preventing Iraq 
from having nuclear weapons was the possession of fissile material.25  It goes on to say 
that Iraq did not have the ability to produce this material indigenously for a long time and 
therefore it would most likely try to acquire the weapons-grade fissile material from 
somewhere else.26  This raised speculation among the Bush administration that Iraq was 
trying to get this material from another country and if Iraq were successful in doing so it 
would be very close to developing a nuclear weapon.  However, the NIE does not give 
any information regarding where Iraq might seek to obtain the enrichment uranium 
necessary to complete its nuclear capabilities.  The October 2002 NIE also reports that in 
order to fund its nuclear program “Baghdad diverts some of the $10 billion worth of 
goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and 
WMD programs instead.”27  The October 2002 NIE gives substantial evidence pointing 
to the existence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq as well as the development of 
nuclear weapons.  Although the NIE points out that Iraq has not been able to complete 
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  Ibid, 5. 
23
  Ibid, 5. 
24
  Ibid, 5. 
25
  Ibid, 6. 
26
  Ibid, 6. 
27
  Ibid, 23. 
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the enrichment process of its nuclear program, which happens to be the most difficult 
part, the NIE also makes clear Iraq’s potential for nuclear power as well as Saddam 
Hussein’s desire for nuclear power illustrated by his tactics of defiance and concealment.  
Judging by the content of the NIE, the Bush administration was wise to consider Iraq a 
threat to national security and a candidate for preemptive action. 
Instead of jumping to conclusions and going straight to war, the Bush 
administration wanted to approach the situation with Iraq diplomatically and gain the 
support of the rest of the world.  Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United 
Nations on February 5, 2003, is an example of how the Bush administration attempted to 
justify its allegations of Iraq’s potential nuclear threat as well as gain the support of the 
United Nations.  Powell begins his speech to the UN with Resolution 1441, which was 
implemented “…to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.”28  Powell says that 
Iraq has failed to comply with Resolution 1441.  Powell goes on to say that his purpose 
“...is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States 
knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction…”29 Secretary Powell is adamant in his 
speech that Iraq has severely breached Resolution 1441 and that there should be 
consequences.  Powell makes the case for the existence of biological weapons stating that 
Iraq has “…never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and 
we know they had.  They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make 
them.  And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents 
                                                        
28
  Colin Powell. “A policy of Evasion and Deception.” The Washington Post 
(accessed October 19, 2010) 1. 
29
  John Ehrenberg and eds. The Iraq Papers, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 
99-100. 
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such as there are 400 bombs.”30  Powell goes on to address nuclear weapons saying that 
there is no suggestion that Saddam Hussein has discarded his nuclear weapons program.31  
Furthermore, Powell proclaims in his speech that the United States has a decade of 
evidence that Saddam Hussein is still trying to get nuclear weapons.32   
Given the certainty of Powell’s speech, he makes it clear that Iraq still has WMD 
and continues to seek nuclear weapons.  Powell proclaims to the UN that “leaving 
Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or 
years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.”33  Powell also presented tape 
recordings to the UN with conversations between Iraqi officers about evacuating certain 
materials from facilities before weapons inspectors entered the country.34  Powell also 
says in his speech that the U.S. has satellite photos showing that banned materials were 
moved from Iraqi WMD facilities.35  Given Powell’s confidence in his speech to the UN, 
one would have to assume that the United States really did have sufficient evidence to 
make such claims.  The Bush administration wanted to make its case clear that Saddam 
Hussein was a threat to the national security of the United States and the rest of the free 
world, especially in the UN.  One would have to assume that the Bush administration 
made sure that everything that Secretary Powell presented to the UN in his speech was 
supported by evidence.  The purpose of Powell’s speech was to present the evidence of 
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WMD in Iraq and to gain the support of the UN so that when the U.S. did take action it 
was not doing so alone. 
In another attempt to gain support for action in Iraq, President Bush gave a speech 
in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, outlining the extent of Iraq’s threat to the United States.  
President Bush points out the danger of Iraq’s regime saying, “It possesses and produces 
chemical and biological weapons.  It is seeking nuclear weapons.”36  Bush distinguishes 
the threat of Iraq from other potential threats proclaiming that “Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons 
to kill thousands of people.  This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has 
invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without 
warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States.”37  In his speech, 
Bush successfully draws a distinction between the threat of Iraq and the threat of other 
nations and he makes it clear that Saddam Hussein is the deciding factor.  Bush argues 
that the United States should not wait to confront Saddam Hussein because in doing so he 
will only grow stronger.38  President Bush also points out in his speech that Iraq is trying 
to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes to make gas centrifuges, all for the purpose of 
producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.39  Bush stressed the need to take 
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action:  “Facing evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, 
that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”40   
President Bush makes a strong argument for why Iraq poses a serious threat to the 
United States and why action needs to be taken.  By the time Bush gave his speech in 
Cincinnati, he was already fairly certain that the United States would have to take 
military action.  However, he wanted to gain as much support as possible and take 
whatever diplomatic measures were necessary before risking American lives.  Based on 
the evidence that Bush provided in his Cincinnati speech along with Colin Powell’s 
speech to the UN, many people felt that Iraq posed a serious threat to the free world 
under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.  This belief was rooted in the Bush 
administration’s assurance that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that 
it was in the process of developing nuclear weapons, which they could have within a year 
once they obtained the weapons grade fissile material if nothing was done.  The 
allegations of WMD presented to the American people and the rest of the world as 
reasoning behind the war were extremely bold statements that the Bush administration 
knew it would have to live up to and answer for if WMD were never found. 
In retrospect it is hard to fathom how the Bush administration could have come up 
with so much intelligence pointing to the existence of WMD in Iraq when none of the 
weapons were found after the invasion.  The Bush administration seemed certain that 
WMD were present in Iraq and that for the sake of national security military intervention 
was necessary because Saddam Hussein’s regime was not complying with UN weapons 
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inspections.  The fact that the Bush administration went to the UN with all of its 
intelligence regarding WMD and in the end no weapons were found hurt the 
administration’s credibility.  While the Bush administration should not have portrayed the 
intelligence to be completely factual, it does not change the fact that there was still a 
degree of uncertainty in respect to Iraq, and this did pose a threat.  Furthermore the Bush 
administration chose to invade Iraq based on preemption.  It did not want to risk the 
possibility of another terrorist or nuclear attack because it did not have conclusive 
evidence.  The Bush administration knew that it had to act quickly because if it waited 
too long Hussein might obtain nuclear weapons.41  If the Bush administration waited, it 
could have attained more conclusive intelligence, but by then it might have been too late 
and the intelligence would have been irrelevant.  Furthermore, the Bush administration 
did give the weapons inspectors a chance to find the weapons stockpiles before it took 
military action.  In March 2003, Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, reported to the 
UN Security Council that the WMD that were unaccounted for in 1998 were still 
unaccounted for.42  These weapons consisted of  
…3.9 tons of VX nerve agent; 6,526 aerial chemical bombs; 550 mustard gas 
shells; 2,062 tons of Mustard precursors; some 15,000 empty 12-mm chemical 
rocket warheads; 8,445 liters of anthrax; growth media that could have produced 
3,000-11,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 6,000-16,000 litres of anthrax, up to 5,600 
liters of Clostridium perfingens, and a significant quantity of an unknown 
bacterial agent; at a minimum 16-30 structural rings for missiles; and at least 15 
special warheads.43  
                                                        
41
  A Report of the Project for the New American Century. “Iraq: Setting the Record 
Straight” (Washington D.C. 2005), iii. 
42
  Ibid, v. 
43
  Ibid, v. 
 25
Although there is no mention of nuclear weapons in this list, it is nevertheless an 
extensive list of unaccounted for weapons that could kill hundreds of thousands of 
people.  
 The Iraq Survey Group, formed in order to conduct a survey of Iraq’s weapons 
programs after the invasion, reported to have uncovered several activities related to 
WMD programs going on in Iraq.  Originally headed by David Kay, the Iraq Survey 
Group discovered a hidden network of laboratories; a prison laboratory complex, 
“reference strains” for biological weapons, research on agents linked to biological 
weapons, and advanced planning on missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometers.44  After 
David Kay stepped down, Charles Duelfer was appointed to take over the Iraq Survey 
Group.  Although Duelfer did not report specific evidence the way that Kay had, Duelfer 
also reported his own findings regarding Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs.  Duelfer 
reported that as UN sanctions became weaker and weaker there was a definite increase in 
activities related to the development of WMD, Saddam Hussein never abandoned his 
objective to continue producing chemical weapons, two of Saddam Hussein’s goals were 
to recover economically and rebuild Iraq’s WMD programs after the first Gulf War, and 
Saddam Hussein’s regime intended to resume its WMD program after UN sanctions were 
lifted all along.45  However, this list of unaccounted for weapons provided by the 
weapons inspectors along with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group were not the 
deciding factor for the United States to go to war.  “The case for war, in short, did not rest 
exclusively on the existence of stockpiles.  It derived from a perception of Saddam’s 
intentions and capabilities, both existing and potential, and was grounded in the reality of 
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Saddam’s prior behavior.”46  Relying on the notion of preemption as a means of national 
security, this reasoning is the most logical explanation for why the Bush administration 
decided to launch the invasion.   
 Although Iraq had been a high priority for the Bush administration ever since the 
president took office, the administration still needed to weigh all of the evidence and 
consider all of its options before it took the nation into a war that would affect the entire 
Middle East.  The Bush administration may have considered Iraq a threat since 2000, but 
it was only after 9/11 that the administration started thinking seriously about taking 
action.  This can be attributed to the changed mentality of the entire nation after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.  The Bush administration wanted regime change in Iraq, and it 
had a lot of reasons to believe that regime change was necessary.  In March of 2003 the 
Bush administration was influenced by an accumulation of evidence: Saddam Hussein’s 
long history of mass murdering, ethnic cleansing, aiding terrorists, and violating UN 
resolutions; the view of former officials in the Clinton administration that Saddam 
Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stockpiles; reports from UN inspectors 
about unaccounted for weapons; and the fact that intelligence prior to the first Gulf War 
had underestimated Iraq’s nuclear capabilities.47  The last thing the Bush administration 
wanted to do was make the mistake of underestimating Iraq’s strength and have it 
backfire on the United States.   
Given the nature of the threat that the Bush administration perceived in Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, it might seem like the Bush administration wanted to remove Saddam 
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Hussein from power regardless of whether or not he possessed WMD.  However, the fact 
remains that Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons in the past and there was 
legitimate reason to believe that he still possessed some of these weapons and he intended 
on developing nuclear weapons.  In the eyes of the Bush administration, this was good 
enough to take the appropriate steps toward war.  Based on the October 2002 NIE, which 
reported that Saddam Hussein still possessed chemical and biological weapons and was 
trying to get nuclear weapons, the Bush administration had the evidence it needed to 
support its invasion of Iraq.  
 The Bush administration then set out to gain support both from the UN and the 
American people.  At the UN the Bush administration sought Resolution 1441 from the 
Security Council to justify that “Iraq would face ‘serious consequences’ as a result of 
continued violations.”48  On November 8, 2002 Resolution 1441 was passed by a 
unanimous vote of 15 to 0.49  This signified a major breakthrough in diplomacy for the 
United States.  By taking diplomatic measures through the UN the Bush administration 
showed that it wanted the disarmament of Iraq above all things and it did not intend to go 
to war unless it was the last resort.  It was only after the Iraqi regime did not comply with 
UN Resolution 1441 that Colin Powell made his speech to the UN arguing that the 
United States had factual evidence of WMD in Iraq and therefore the United States was 
justified in going into Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power.   
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President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati along with other speeches made clear to the 
American people that there was evidence of WMD in Iraq and due to the previous 
behavior of Saddam Hussein, military action seemed likely.  With all the certainty 
surrounded by Colin Powell’s speech to the UN along with President Bush’s speeches it 
was clear to the public at the time that Iraq posed a major threat to the national security of 
the United States and therefore military action was necessary.  Due to the nature of the 
war in Iraq that was conducted under preemption, the intelligence of WMD in Iraq was 
crucial and the Bush administration placed a great deal of emphasis on it.  Since the Bush 
administration was taking the offensive in hopes of preventing further aggression toward 
the United States, it had to be sure that its allegations concerning WMD were strongly 
supported; otherwise, the administration would have a serious problem if no WMD were 
found.  If the Bush administration placed the onus of its decision to go to war on the fact 
that it was uncertain about Saddam Hussein’s capabilities and it did not want to risk 
another tragedy, the sentiment might have been different.  However, the Bush 
administration weighed its decision to go to war heavily on its certainty that there were 
WMD in Iraq and therefore the success or failure on the decision for war relied heavily 
on whether or not the WMD were found.  One of the only explanations for why no WMD 
were found after the invasion was the conclusion that Saddam Hussein had a hidden 
weapons program.50  However it was more likely that no WMD were found because the 
intelligence was flawed and politicized by the Bush administration. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FAILED INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICIZATION 
In March of 2003 the United States embarked on a mission to take over Iraq and 
in the process overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and disarm the country of its 
WMD.  The process of forming a military strategy for the war took a very long time, and 
the process of gaining the support of the American people as well as the rest of the world 
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took even longer.  Attempts at diplomacy were prolonged by the entire UN resolution 
process along with the Bush administration trying to get as much support from the free 
world as possible in order to build a respectable coalition.  However, this coalition was 
formed on the foundation that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed WMD, a foundation 
that the Bush administration supported publicly on numerous accounts.  If the American 
people along with the rest of the world had not been confident in the accuracy of the 
claims of the Bush administration, they likely would not have supported the war in the 
same fashion.  However, the fact that no WMD were found once the United States 
military invaded Iraq left the entire world wondering why no WMD were found.  On 
January 28, 2004, David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, said that 85 percent of the 
work was done and that he didn’t ever think they would find WMD.51  After this, the 
Bush administration placed the blame on the Intelligence Community and a failure of 
intelligence.  The Bush administration proposed an independent bipartisan commission 
designed to investigate WMD and intelligence problems.52  The Intelligence Community 
argued that it was not a failure of intelligence, but instead it was the way in which the 
administration interpreted the intelligence in order to support its objectives.  As I will 
show, both the Intelligence Community and the Bush administration were at fault for 
making such a strong case for the presence of WMD.  It is unfortunate that this failure of 
the Bush administration and the Intelligence Community could not be seen before the 
war, however, the fact remains that the intelligence of WMD in Iraq should have never 
been presented to the public as conclusive and the primary reason for why the United 
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States needed to take military action.  A report by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, which conducted an investigation into the Intelligence Community’s 
assessments of Iraq before the war, depicts how there was a failure of intelligence in 
gathering enough conclusive information on the extent of Saddam Hussein’s weapons 
programs.  Furthermore the investigation by the Iraq Survey Group also shows that our 
intelligence on Iraq leading up to the war was not consistent with the true nature of what 
weapons were actually in Iraq.  The failure of intelligence was not the only problem with 
the allegations of WMD in Iraq.  The personal account of George Tenet, director of the 
CIA during the Clinton and Bush administrations, illustrates how the CIA’s intelligence 
was misinterpreted as well as politicized by the Bush administration in order to support 
its foreign policy objectives.  This is not to say that the United States should not have 
waged a war in Iraq.  Iraq did pose a threat to the national security of the United States.  
The issue is that the Bush administration used insufficient evidence to support its claims 
that WMD were present in Iraq when in actuality they were making these claims under 
false pretenses.  There is no doubt that the United States and its allies were safer after the 
invasion of Iraq however it was at the expense of the Bush administration making 
inaccurate assumptions to the world supported by failed intelligence. 
 The Bush administration set out to conduct a war based on preemption for the 
sake of national security.  Due to the fact that it was not reacting to an imminent threat 
but instead trying to prevent and remove a potential threat, the Bush administration relied 
heavily on intelligence provided by the CIA that would provide it with the information 
needed in order to make a well-informed decision.  The October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate acted as the primary source of this information and was the basis 
 32
under which the Bush administration would make its decisions on Iraq.  However, the 
October 2002 NIE proved to be inaccurate only after the fact.  Furthermore, the Bush 
administration’s failure to interpret the intelligence correctly was exposed by George 
Tenet’s personal account as well as numerous other accounts of the events leading up to 
the 2003 invasion. 
 In June of 2003 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted an 
investigation of the Intelligence Community titled “Report on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.”  The investigation looked into 
the prewar intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, Iraq’s ties to terrorism, Saddam 
Hussein’s threat to the region, and his previous use of WMD against his own people.53  
The main objective of the report was to decide whether the judgments made by the 
Intelligence Community regarding WMD in Iraq were sound and accurate.54  One of the 
conclusions of the report was that “the major key judgments in the NIE, particularly that 
Iraq ‘is reconstituting its nuclear program…has chemical and biological weapons,’ either 
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting…”55 The fact 
that Iraq tried to deceive UN weapons inspectors for years along with the fact that Iraq 
could not account for chemical and biological weapons may have led CIA analysts to 
believe that Iraq still had these weapons.56  However this was an assumption on the part 
of the analysts due to the fact that they did not have information to prove this for certain.  
Another conclusion of the Senate Committee’s report was that the analysts did not make 
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clear to policymakers the uncertainties surrounding the NIE.57  The report states: “At the 
time the IC drafted and coordinated the NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs in September 
2002, most of what intelligence analysts actually ‘knew’ about Iraq’s weapons programs 
pre-dated the 1991 Gulf War, leaving them with very little direct knowledge about the 
current state of those programs.”58  One of the major problems with the NIE was that 
most of the known facts used by the analysts about Iraq’s weapons programs came from 
before the first Gulf War, more than a decade before.59  Therefore analysts did not know 
as much as they appeared to know.  Another conclusion drawn from the report was that 
there was an underlying presumption within the Intelligence Community that Iraq had a 
growing WMD program.60  This presumption led analysts to infer that certain ambiguous 
evidence actually pointed to a WMD program.61  This dynamic is known as “group 
think” and is defined as “…examining few alternatives, selective gathering of 
information, pressure to conform within the group or withhold criticism, and collective 
rationalization.”62  The “group think” dynamic that perpetuated itself throughout the 
Intelligence Community proved to be very detrimental to the entire intelligence gathering 
process.  Everyone was acting under the notion that there were WMD in Iraq and 
therefore whatever intelligence analysts collected was automatically assumed to support 
this underlying notion.  What was worse was that no one was able to stand up and make 
the argument that the intelligence was only supporting one side and it was not 
considering other possible options.  Another problem was that when there was 
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information that did not support the WMD claims, analysts chose not to report it.  For 
example, weapons inspections in November of 2002 did not find any traces of active 
WMD programs however analysts did not think this was significant and thus chose not to 
report it.63  The fourth conclusion of the report was that the assessments in the NIE were 
based on judgments, and the uncertainties surrounding those particular judgments were 
never considered.64  While these judgments may have been logical, the fact that they were 
treated as truths without ever considering the uncertainty turned out to be a huge problem 
and was the main reason why the Intelligence Community concluded that WMD were 
actually in Iraq.  The fifth conclusion of the report was that managers of the analysts 
within the Intelligence Community failed to facilitate the intelligence process in the sense 
that they did not challenge assumptions or consider possible alternatives.65  The sixth 
conclusion of the report was that the Intelligence Community did not have any additional 
sources on WMD programs in Iraq after 1998.66  The fact that there was no real new 
information after 1998 highlights a huge failure in the intelligence process.  A lot could 
have happened between 1998 and 2002 when the NIE was published and the analysts 
failed to recognize this giant gap in their intelligence.  The seventh conclusion of the 
report was that the CIA failed to share certain information and in some cases withheld 
information from the rest of the Intelligence Community.67  In so doing the CIA created a 
disadvantage for the entire Intelligence Community because no one was on the same 
page. 
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 The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report also examined the Niger uranium 
case.  There was some intelligence dating to 1991 that Iraq was attempting to acquire 
yellowcake uranium from Niger.  The attainment of this uranium would have given Iraq 
the last ingredient needed to complete its nuclear capabilities.  The CIA was not certain 
that the exchange of uranium between Iraq and Niger actually happened; however, it did 
report that the two countries had been negotiating the shipment for some time.68  The CIA 
supposedly had intelligence of a foreign government service saying that Iraq was 
attempting to get 500 tons of uranium from Niger.69  In addition, a CIA nuclear analyst 
believed that Iraq could have been trying to get uranium from Africa and Niger could 
have possibly supplied Iraq with the necessary amount.70  While it was possible for Iraq 
to have been trying to get uranium from Niger, the intelligence was not nearly strong 
enough to place any level of confidence on the idea.  The problem with this intelligence 
was that it was included in the NIE under the assumption that there was a good chance it 
was true and that Iraq actually was procuring uranium from Niger.  However, the only 
thing the intelligence supported was that Niger did have uranium and Iraq was trying to 
get uranium.  There was no intelligence supporting a link between the two countries 
however it was alluded to in the NIE as if it were.   
The report that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence put together clearly 
illustrates how the Intelligence Community improperly carried out the intelligence 
gathering process.  The report points out the biased approach taken by the Intelligence 
Community as well as the exaggeration of certain evidence.  The biggest problem of the 
                                                        
68
  Ibid, Niger. 
69
  Ibid, Continuing Analysis. 
70
  Ibid, Continuing Analysis. 
 36
October 2002 NIE was that the CIA set out to put it together with the mindset that there 
were WMD in Iraq.  This reflected on the entire NIE and as a result no attention was paid 
to the alternatives.  There was a degree of uncertainty pertaining to Iraq’s WMD 
programs and many of the analysts equated this uncertainty to mean that there were 
WMD in existence in Iraq.  The analysts never considered the fact that while Iraq did 
have some weapons program capabilities there actually were not any stockpiles of 
weapons.  The fact that the NIE takes such a strong stance on the existence of WMD in 
Iraq and its nuclear capabilities was reflected in the Bush administration’s decision to go 
to war.  The Bush administration used a great deal of the information in the NIE to justify 
its claims that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and it presented these claims to the 
United Nations and the American people as a reason to take action against Iraq.  If the 
intelligence process had been carried out with more discretion and if the analysts had 
considered all of the possible options, the NIE might not have been as conclusive and 
therefore the Bush administration would not have appeared as certain that WMD were in 
Iraq and that it posed a major threat to national security. 
 The findings of the Iraq Survey Group after the invasion also support the claim 
that there was an intelligence failure leading up to the war.  The Iraq Survey Group Final 
Report offers valuable insight into the capabilities of Iraq’s weapons programs, Iraq’s 
potential for nuclear weapons, and Saddam Hussein’s intent regarding WMD.  The ISG’s 
final report makes several claims that Saddam Hussein wanted to remove UN sanctions 
as well as rebuild his WMD capabilities.  Saddam Hussein believed that WMD were 
essential to the survival of his regime and he also felt that he had the right to possess such 
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weapons.71  It was almost as if Saddam Hussein was obsessed with obtaining WMD 
capabilities.  He felt that possession of WMD would be helpful in countering any threat 
from Iran or Israel, whom he viewed as primary threats.72  Although Israel is an ally of 
the United States, Saddam Hussein did not consider the United States as a direct threat.73  
Saddam Hussein definitely intended to rebuild his WMD programs as well as try to lift 
UN sanctions.74  However it is unclear for what purpose he intended to do so.  Saddam 
Hussein would have obviously been very dangerous with WMD and he had used 
chemical weapons in the past; however, the ISG found no indication that he wanted to 
use WMD against the United States or that he even possessed them following the Gulf 
War.  It is true that Saddam Hussein did not comply with specific UN resolutions and that 
he did make attempts to deceive weapons inspections.  However, the ISG states in its 
report that it did not find evidence of any WMD stockpiles following the 2003 invasion 
but that there is the possibility that some weapons did exist based on interviews and 
documents.75   
The big question is why was Saddam Hussein being so secretive during the 
weapons inspections if he did not have major stockpiles of WMD?  One possibility is that 
he did have stockpiles and therefore it was necessary to hide them.  There is also the 
possibility that he didn’t have WMD stockpiles, but may have wanted to make it look like 
he did.  The reason for this would have been to prevent any kind of attack out of fear that 
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Saddam Hussein would use WMD on any aggressors.  The ISG makes it clear that 
Saddam Hussein desired the possession of WMD for the interests of his regime.  There is 
uncertainty whether he would have used these weapons against his enemies or simply as 
a deterrent.  However, the ISG did not find any evidence of the existence of WMD in Iraq 
before Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Furthermore no evidence was found to support the 
claim that Iraq was trying to obtain uranium from another country or even try to produce 
uranium indigenously.76  Also the ISG did not find any evidence to support the idea that 
Iraq was trying to get aluminum tubes for the purpose of nuclear weapons.77  Instead the 
aluminum tubes were most likely for the production of rockets.78  When reading the 
ISG’s final report one must take into account that its survey was conducted after 
Operation Iraqi Freedom so there is the possibility that any evidence of WMD stockpiles 
was destroyed before they could get to it.  Nevertheless the ISG conducted an extensive 
survey in which they interviewed several members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and 
studied numerous documents on Iraq’s weapons programs.  Its findings do suggest that 
Saddam Hussein did want WMD and that he did have weapons programs.  Its findings do 
not provide any evidence that Saddam Hussein had chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons following the Gulf War of 1991.  These findings show that the intelligence 
provided by the Intelligence Community prior to the war was not solid.  A large amount 
of the intelligence was exaggerated to support existing judgments.  Also the Intelligence 
Community did not consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein was hiding his weapons 
capabilities or lack thereof for the sake of Iraq’s national security, not for use against the 
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United States.  The Intelligence Community never formally informed the Bush 
administration of these possibilities and as a result the intelligence that there were WMD 
in Iraq was highly mischaracterized.  The failure of intelligence was not the only mistake 
made prior to the invasion of Iraq.  The blame also falls on the Bush administration for 
interpreting the intelligence in a way that would support its objectives and then 
presenting it to the public as if it were a fact.    
 George Tenet played a crucial role in the intelligence process and in the final 
decision to go to war by the Bush administration.  As Director of the CIA, Tenet was in 
direct contact with the Bush administration during the entire period before the war and 
during the war as well.  Tenet offers keen insight on how the decision process unfolded 
and his personal account illustrates how the Bush administration in many ways abused 
the intelligence it was provided in order to get its point across about WMD in Iraq.  Tenet 
recognizes the fact that foreign policy changed after 9/11.  The Bush administration used 
9/11 as motivation to act against any danger of Iraq’s WMD programs.79  Unfortunately 
the costs and benefits of preemptive action were never debated within the 
administration.80  This can be seen from the attitudes of those involved in preparing the 
U.S. military that sensed very early on the inevitability of the upcoming war.81  Many 
critics today believe that the Bush administration was fixing the intelligence around the 
policy instead of the other way around.  However according to Richard Dearlove, head of 
MI-6 in Great Britain, “…the cause for war was more about the politics in the Middle 
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East, not WMD, and the intelligence was just being used in an undisciplined manner.”82  
It is clear that the Bush administration considered Iraq to be a top priority in terms of 
foreign policy.  However the way the Bush administration portrayed the war as necessary 
because of Saddam Hussein’s WMD was wrong.  In 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney 
gave a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he stated …”there is no doubt 
that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction…he is amassing them to use 
against our friends, against our allies, and against us…Saddam will acquire nuclear 
weapons very soon.”83  Cheney should have never made these statements to the public.  
While these statements may have been beliefs of the Bush administration, they were not 
facts supported by solid intelligence.  In fact, Tenet makes it clear that the CIA never 
cleared Cheney’s speech and his statements overstepped the bounds of what the CIA’s 
intelligence could support.84  The more reasonable belief held by the CIA was that Iraq 
probably could not obtain nuclear weapons until the end of the decade.85  This implies 
that Iraq would not have the weapons grade material needed to build a nuclear weapon 
for several more years and then it would take at least a year longer to build the weapon 
once it had the material. 
The case for WMD was clearly not the only reason the Bush administration 
wanted to go to war in Iraq.  The removal of Saddam Hussein along with a democracy in 
the Middle East was both very appealing to the Bush administration.  The reason why so 
much emphasis was placed on the case for WMD was that it received a great deal of 
attention from the public.  The imminence of a nuclear threat would encourage action 
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above all things.  The Bush administration knew that if it could sell the case for WMD in 
Iraq, it would gain tremendous support for the war.  The October 2002 NIE was created 
for this purpose.  Tenet, reluctant to carry out the formation of the NIE, knew he had no 
choice saying, “…we don’t make policy.  Our job is to tell the people who do what we 
know and what we think.  It’s up to them to decide what to do about it.”86  However a 
large portion of the intelligence in the October NIE was taken from previously published 
documents because of time constraints.87  So in reality the October 2002 did have some 
new intelligence, however, it also regurgitated old intelligence that might not have been 
relevant at the time.  
Also, the section in the NIE about yellowcake uranium was taken out of context.  
The NIE acknowledged the possibility that Saddam Hussein could acquire the 
yellowcake from Niger; however, it did not say that this was very likely.88  The Bush 
administration only paid attention to the part regarding Niger and made allegations that 
there were negotiations for the uranium between the two countries when this in fact was 
not very likely at all.  President Bush made a huge mistake by addressing the case of 
enriched uranium from Niger in his State of the Union Address in January 2003.  Bush 
declared, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”89  Tenet had earlier made it clear that the 
statement about uranium from Niger should not be included in any speeches because it 
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could not be confirmed.90  Furthermore Ambassador Joseph Wilson went public in a 
piece in the New York Times on July 6, 2003 titled “What I Didn’t Find in Africa” saying, 
“There was never any evidence of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger.”91  Ambassador 
Wilson had previously spent time in Africa and he was asked by the Bush administration 
to go to Niger to confirm whether or not the allegations that Iraq had received yellowcake 
uranium from Niger were true.  Ambassador Wilson reported back that there was no 
evidence to support such allegations.  Nevertheless the Bush administration still decided 
to include the allegations of uranium from Niger in the President’s State of the Union 
address, most likely to make the case for war more convincing to the public.  Wilson’s 
main point in his piece was that the Bush administration knew it was putting a lie into the 
President’s speech and nothing was done about it.  After Wilson went public the Bush 
administration fired back at Wilson in an attempt to make his statement less credible.  For 
example, Ari Fleischer, President Bush’s press secretary, told the media that Wilson was 
responsible for the Niger government’s denial of the uranium deal saying, “Wouldn’t any 
government deny it?”92  Another example came from Clifford May who suggested that 
Wilson went public because he was a partisan Democrat.93  The Bush administration also 
sought to exploit Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, who worked for the CIA as a spy.  
Robert Novak wrote a column in the Washington Post on July 14, 2003 saying, “Wilson 
never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on 
weapons of mass destruction.  Two senior administration officials told me Wilson’s wife 
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suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report.”94  There was no benefit 
to revealing Plame’s identity other than to intimidate Wilson after he took his case public 
and made the Bush administration look bad for including such an outright lie in the 
President’s speech.  The Bush administration most likely employed these intimidation 
tactics to discourage anyone else from going public.  The administration obviously had 
something to hide.  
While the Bush administration used the intelligence on Iraq to its advantage, 
Tenet argues that it did not directly influence the intelligence gathering process.  The 
intelligence itself was flawed and it did not correctly assess the reality of the situation in 
Iraq however policymakers did not attempt to influence analysts to report certain things.95  
On the other hand, the Bush administration did politicize the intelligence in an attempt to 
make it appear more convincing to the public.  In doing so, the Bush administration only 
used intelligence that would support its arguments about WMD, and it did not inform the 
public of other intelligence. 
 There was a definite process of preparing the intelligence on WMD to be 
presented to the public.  The Bush administration wanted to make sure it had all the 
intelligence possible to present to the public, and it wanted it to be believable.  At a 
meeting in December, 2002, Tenet and other intelligence officials were supposed to 
present information on Iraq’s WMD that was true and that could also be presented to the 
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public.96  When this meeting took place everyone in the National Security Council 
already believed that chemical and biological weapons were in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal 
and he was developing nuclear weapons.97  The purpose of the meeting was only to 
decide how to take the case public.  In the meeting Tenet discussed the possibility that the 
public case could include satellite photos, communications intercepts, and human 
intelligence reports to give the public a better understanding.98  Tenet reassured President 
Bush that the public case was a “slam dunk.”99  Tenet’s quote was later exaggerated as 
the deciding factor for going to war.  However, this comment from Tenet came only three 
months before the invasion and the Bush administration had already made serious plans 
for war.  One account portrays Tenet jumping in the air shouting, “It’s a slam dunk case!” 
and from that point on the President was convinced.100  This portrayal makes it seem like 
Tenet was the deciding factor in the decision to go to war when in actuality this was not 
the case at all.  Tenet’s “slam dunk” remark may have been dramatized for the sake of 
drawing attention away from President Bush.  While Tenet did believe that WMD in Iraq 
would be an easy case, his comment was interpreted to be the final straw in Bush’s 
decision to go to war.  His comment was exaggerated in the same way that the 
intelligence was exaggerated.  Furthermore, after the meeting in which Tenet made this 
quote President Bush told the CIA to put together the best information it had on WMD 
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into a document.101  This is an example of how the Bush administration only paid 
attention to intelligence on the existence of WMD without considering any of the 
alternative intelligence.  The Bush administration knew it wanted to take action in Iraq 
early on in the administration and it had intelligence, according to the administration, of 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs.  The big hurdle for the Bush administration was 
making a case to the public that justified war. 
 The case that the Bush administration made to the public determined whether or 
not the United States would go to war.  If the United States did not have popular support, 
it would have been far more difficult to launch an invasion of Iraq.  Due to the fact that it 
was a war of preemption, public support was necessary.  It was imperative for the Bush 
administration to make a strong case for WMD in Iraq if it wanted to take military action.  
The Bush administration’s case for WMD was also presented to the public in Colin 
Powell’s speech to the UN on February 5, 2003.  Powell worked very closely with the 
CIA to come up with his speech.  While Powell’s speech did end up producing the 
desired effect of the Bush administration, a great deal of the information used in his 
speech did not hold up.  One particular part referenced an Iraqi spy codenamed 
CURVEBALL who supposedly revealed information of the locations of certain chemical 
and biological weapons laboratories in Iraq.102  Unfortunately the information provided 
by CURVEBALL did not pan out and as a result Powell’s speech lost credibility.  In 
                                                        
101
  Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade 
Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 288. 
102
  George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2007) 375. 
 46
many ways the CIA did allow bad information to fall into the hands of policymakers and 
Tenet acknowledges this fact.103  
 While Powell was preparing his speech to the UN he realized that human sources 
on Iraq’s WMD were scarce and he was influenced a great deal by Saddam Hussein’s 
past behavior which entailed the use of WMD in the 1980’s and the concealment of 
WMD in the 1990’s.104  As a result the United Nations and the rest of the world were 
presented with information that they considered to be factual when in actuality it was 
information that the Bush administration believed to be possible.  At the same time, the 
Bush administration never took the initiative to question the intelligence or possible 
alternatives.  The administration accepted the intelligence for what it was worth and used 
it to its advantage.  
 When an administration goes to war, it has to make a case for why the war is 
justified.  The Bush administration had several reasons for why it felt a war in Iraq was 
justified.  However, it chose to present the case for WMD to the public because it 
believed it had the most intelligence to support that case.  Furthermore the UN had been 
trying to conduct effective weapons inspections for WMD in Iraq for years.  There is no 
doubt that WMD in Iraq was an issue, but the Bush administration took the issue to 
another level by telling the public that there were WMD stockpiles in Iraq because of 
solid intelligence.  The analysts who put together the October 2002 NIE should not have 
been as conclusive in reporting the evidence and Colin Powell should not have made his 
case so absolute in his speech to the United Nations. 
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 It is evident that the Bush administration exaggerated the intelligence on Iraq’s 
WMD in order to make its reasoning for war appear more viable.  However, the Bush 
administration did consider the threat of WMD in Iraq a serious one, otherwise the 
invasion forces would not have prepared for the possibility of a chemical or biological 
attack.105  The threat was known but the actual extent and danger of the threat is what was 
disputed.  Up until the October 2002 NIE, the CIA made sure to say that it was possible 
for Iraq to have weapons stockpiles.106  The CIA’s stance became more certain only after 
the NIE was reported in which the CIA believed there to be a presence of chemical 
weapons stockpiles in Iraq.107  Because the 2002 NIE did not contain very much new 
information, it is difficult to understand why there was a sudden shift in the stance of the 
CIA on WMD in Iraq.  Perhaps the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community knew 
by this time that the Bush administration was set on war and so the CIA reported what it 
thought the Bush administration wanted to hear.  Another possibility is that the CIA 
honestly felt that Iraq posed a threat to national security and that based on the Bush 
Doctrine of preemption war was inevitable.  This however does not excuse the fact that 
certain intelligence such as the October 2002 NIE contained beliefs and possibilities that 
were presented as certainties.  The underlying problem lies in the manner in which the 
Bush administration presented its case to the public.  The Bush administration was so 
certain about the presence of WMD in Iraq that it led many to believe that Saddam 
Hussein really did have WMD and that he intended on using them.  Colin Powell’s 
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speech to the United Nations, along with speeches from President Bush and Vice 
President Cheney, embodies this unwarranted certainty from the Bush administration.   
 It is unfortunate that most of the failures within the Intelligence Community were 
not discovered until after the fact.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report 
illustrates how the October 2002 NIE was not a document that should have been used to 
guarantee WMD in Iraq.  Sources have shown that the intelligence of yellowcake 
uranium from Niger was not solid intelligence.  Also, the proposal that aluminum tubes 
acquired by Iraq for the development of nuclear weapons was not supported by credible 
intelligence either.   The only solid intelligence that should have been regarded as reliable 
was the assessment that Iraq could potentially have nuclear capabilities in a decade, Iraq 
had not adhered to the UN Security Resolutions since the Gulf War, and Saddam Hussein 
had engaged in deception in attempts to hide certain things from UN weapons inspectors.  
Otherwise there was no solid intelligence of the existence of weapons stockpiles in Iraq.  
Even if the intelligence process prior to the war had been conducted correctly with all the 
options considered, it is difficult to think that the Bush administration might have made a 
different decision.  The fault of the Bush administration lies in the fact that it made a case 
to the public that was not supported by legitimate intelligence.  While the CIA is at fault 
for this, the Bush administration must also be held accountable since it did not take an 
unbiased approach to assessing the intelligence.  Instead of portraying its motive in Iraq 
as preemption and the establishment of democracy in the Middle East, the Bush 
administration believed it was necessary to make a case for the existence of WMD in 
Iraq.  In doing so the Bush administration misled the public and made justification for 
war under false pretenses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 
 The Bush administration viewed Iraq as a foreign policy objective ever since it 
took office in 2000 and plans for war were being prepared over a year before the actual 
invasion.  One cannot assume that the Bush administration would have decided not to 
launch Operation Iraqi Freedom unless there was absolute certainty that WMD were 
nonexistent in Iraq.  This intelligence never existed and so the Bush administration chose 
action instead of running the risk of an expanding arsenal of WMD under the hand of a 
ruthless dictator.  The Bush administration did not want “…the smoking gun to be a 
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mushroom cloud.”108  In President Bush’s ultimatum to Iraq before the invasion he made 
it clear that the United States intended to confront Saddam Hussein proclaiming “We 
meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that 
we do not have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and doctors on the 
streets of our cities.”109 
Preemption arguably was the right decision in terms of United States foreign 
policy towards Iraq.  Given the level of uncertainty and past actions of the Iraqi regime, 
the Bush administration wanted to err on the side of precaution.  In this sense, the war in 
Iraq was the right decision.  However, in another sense, the intelligence and the course of 
events leading up to the 2003 invasion were filled with bad decisions.  For the sake of 
national security, military intervention was the right decision however the Bush 
administration’s attempt to justify the war turned out to be illegitimate.  In many ways 
there was a failure of intelligence.  The October 2002 NIE was put together by analysts 
who shared a common view that WMD were present in Iraq.  Furthermore the NIE itself 
contained several conclusive statements about WMD stockpiles that should have been 
reported as judgments instead of facts.  Also, the Intelligence Community failed to 
recognize possible alternatives.  By only concentrating on the existence of WMD 
intelligence analysts failed to inform officials of the possibility that there were no WMD.  
Because of this the intelligence reported to the Bush administration was not as accurate as 
it was made out to be.  
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 While the Intelligence Community did not report the intelligence on Iraq as 
accurately as it should have, the Bush administration also did not take an unbiased 
approach to interpreting it.  In order to support its motive for war, the Bush 
administration engaged in “cherry-picking” and “stovepiping.”110  “Cherry-picking” is a 
term used to describe when officials embellish certain intelligence in order to support a 
policy and also downplay other intelligence that does not support the policy.111  An 
example of this was when the Bush administration made a big deal about the Niger 
enrichment uranium case in an attempt to make it seem like Iraq was closer to a nuclear 
weapon than it actually was.  The Bush administration did this without acknowledging 
other intelligence proposing that this was not very likely.  “Stovepiping occurs when 
specific pieces of raw intelligence are reported directly to officials without putting them 
through the entire analyzation process.112  In some cases “stovepiping” may be warranted 
however “…when used to justify policies to the public they incorrectly imply the backing 
of the intelligence community.”113  An example of “stovepiping” is when the President’s 
State of the Union speech included a statement that the United States had evidence that 
Iraq obtained uranium from Niger.  While there may have been intelligence reported to 
the President about this, the statement in the President’s speech was never cleared by the 
CIA.  While there was a failure of intelligence, it is difficult to know if the intelligence 
really mattered in terms of whether or not the Bush administration chose to go to war in 
Iraq.  President Bush probably would have made the decision even if the intelligence did 
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not support claims of WMD due to the fact that Saddam Hussein wanted WMD, 
particularly nuclear weapons.114  It is evident that the Bush administration overstated the 
intelligence of WMD in Iraq to the public in order to make the threat appear more 
imminent than it actually was.  While part of the blame falls on the Intelligence 
Community, the final call for war came from the Bush administration and for this reason 
it bears most of the responsibility for never finding WMD in Iraq. 
The war in Iraq must be attributed to preemption instead of a search for WMD 
stockpiles.  Although the Bush administration portrayed the war in Iraq as a mission to 
rid the country of its WMD programs, it was more a mission to protect national security 
and establish a democracy in the Middle East.  There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein 
posed a serious threat to the United States due to his prior actions and his quest for 
nuclear weapons.  However that threat was made more evident because of a failure of 
intelligence and its politicization by the Bush administration.  Of course there was some 
intelligence that pointed to the possibility of WMD stockpiles in Iraq and going into the 
war the Bush administration did expect to find WMD.  It was only after the fact that no 
WMD were found that the public realized that the Bush administration had misled them.  
The Bush administration most likely felt that in order to go to war the case of WMD had 
to look strong.  While this was wrong in many ways it does not change the fact that the 
war in Iraq was a necessary act of preemption in order to protect the national security of 
the United States.  By implementing the Bush Doctrine after 9/11, this is what President 
Bush set out to do.   The war in Iraq was not simple by any means and thousands of 
Americans lost their lives fighting for their country.  However, due to the fact that the 
                                                        
114  Ibid, 125. 
 53
Iraq war ended in August 2010, it has not been long enough to assess whether or not the 
war was successful in the long run.  Because the war in Iraq is so recent, most people are 
critical of the Bush administration, for not finding any WMD following the invasion, 
without thinking about the bigger picture.  Time will tell if the removal of a dictator and 
the establishment of a democracy in the Middle East was the right decision in terms of 
foreign policy.  Although the Bush administration may have misled the public in 
justifying the war in Iraq, it acted in the best interest of the United States.  The failure of 
intelligence and politicization by the Bush administration was a big mistake, but it does 
not outweigh the decision to take the fight to the enemy and protect the freedom of the 
American people.   
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